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ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 was the second edition of ISA standard to address safety instrumented systems 
for the process industry sector and was recognized by OSHA as a good engineering practice within 
process safety management. Nevertheless, standards must evolve over time based on application 
experience. After a decade of international process sector experience in applying these 
requirements for safety instrumented systems (SIS), a new edition of the IEC 61511 international 
standard was published. Recently published, ANSI/ISA 61511-1 brings the ISA standard into 
complete alignment with IEC 61511-1. This paper will review ten major themes of change between 
ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 and ANSI/ISA 61511-1.  
 
1 Introduction 
The American National Standard ANSI/ISA-S84.01-1996 “Application of Safety Instrumented 
Systems for the Process Industries” [1] was published just a few years after the issuance of the 
OSHA regulation on process safety management (PSM) [2]. Within this context, this first edition 
of the safety instrumented system (SIS) standard focused predominately on the design, installation 
and change management of the system hardware and said little about other aspects of functional 
safety management already addressed in the PSM regulation. This original standard also said little 
about application programming for programmable electronic systems, which were a relatively new 
logic solver technology compared to the simpler safety relays and trip amplifiers that were in 
common use at the time for emergency shutdown systems and other safety applications. 
 
Of course, the need for a standard on safety instrumented systems was not limited to the United 
States of America.  The first edition of the U.S. standard on SIS was an input to the newly formed 
IEC 61511 committee. Not all of the nations involved in the IEC committee had laws similar to 
the U.S. regulation on process safety management. Therefore, many of the changes made in the 
 
development of IEC 61511-1:2003 [3] focused on adding the functional safety management 
requirements that would otherwise have been absent in the international context. Since the 
programmable electronic logic solver was by this time a much more established technology, IEC 
61511-1:2003 also included requirements for the application programming for SIS using this 
technology.  For the most part, the resulting set of requirements would have been very familiar to 
facilities subject to both OSHA PSM regulations and the ANSI/ISA-S84.01 standard.  IEC 61511-
1:2003 was adopted the following year as the second edition of the ISA SIS standard, retitled 
ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 [4], with only the addition of one clause in the scope to address existing 
systems that had been designed and implemented using the 1996 standard.   
 
During the first handful of years after the publication of ANSI/ISA 84.00.01, members of the ISA 
84 committee, the MT61511 team, and the broader industrial community began to note sections 
of the standard where systematic misunderstanding in application still seemed to be occurring 
relatively often. The fundamental safety instrumented system hardware and functional safety 
management requirements in the standard were by this time well-established process safety 
practice across the globe. Therefore, the major change themes for the second edition of IEC 61511-
1 [5] focused on clarifying existing concepts in the requirements to improve the systematic use of 
the standard in these sections. Adopted by ISA without change in late 2017, the standard now 
known as ANSI/ISA 61511-1 [6] (retiring the ISA 84.00.01 nomenclature) can be more 
consistently applied around the world. 
 
These major change themes can be grouped together into the following categories: 
 Hazards and Risk Analysis (H&RA) and Specification 
 Detailed Design and Engineering 




2 H&RA and Specification 
The failure frequency claimed for initiating sources related to the basic process control system 
(BPCS) and the risk reduction allocated to BPCS protection layers directly impact the risk 
reduction target for an associated safety instrumented function (SIF). Likewise, any common 
causes or dependencies between functions involved in a hazardous event initiation or the 
responding protection strategy can affect the residual frequency of the hazardous outcome.  
Finally, once a SIF is required by the H&RA, the specification of performance requirements for 
the SIS performing the SIF must be sufficiently clear that the system is designed and implemented 
correctly, resulting in a demonstrated performance consistent with the safety integrity level (SIL) 
the H&RA assumed. 
 
All three of these concepts were addressed in ANSI/ISA 84.00.01.  However, a few years after this 
standard was published, comments submitted by experienced personnel revealed that further 
clarification would be needed in the new edition. 
 
 
2.1 Limits on BPCS failure frequency and target risk reduction 
Submitted comments on IEC 61511-1:2003 and ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 revealed that the previously 
existing two clauses (9.4.2 and 9.4.3) were not sufficiently clear in expressing the limitations that 
had been intended by the committee: 
 
a) Minimum assumed frequency of a BPCS failure (whether referring to the 
system as a whole or to just one part thereof) that could initiate a hazardous 
event 
b) Maximum risk reduction that could be claimed for a protection layer within the 
BPCS 
c) Maximum number of protection layers that could be executed within the BPCS 
for a given hazardous events 
d) Requirements for independence for protective layers executed within the 
BPCS 
 
These limitations reflect the overall performance impact associated to the less rigorous design, 
implementation, and management practices typically applied to the BPCS (as compared to those 
used to manage the SIS).  The recognition that the BPCS had a limited capability to provide risk 
reduction for process safety incidents had been documented in the first edition of CCPS Guidelines 
for Safe Automation of Chemical Processes [7], published just after the OSHA PSM standard was 
issued. Further guidance was provided a few years later in CCPS Layer of Protection Analysis: 
Simplified Process Risk Assessment [8]. Reinforcing and building upon these original positions, 
additional technical guidance was provided in CCPS Guidelines for Safe and Reliable 
Instrumented Protective Systems [9] and  Guidelines for Initiating Events and Independent 
Protection Layers in Layer of Protection Analysis [10]. The values provided in ANSI/ISA 61511 
for each of limitations listed above reflect the long-standing experience of overall BPCS 
performance that is documented in these industry consensus publications. 
 
2.2 Requirements for claiming RRF>10,000 in total for instrumented safeguards 
The verification, validation, and change management practices documented in ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 
were designed to keep the probability of systematic error relatively low for a given safeguard.  
However, once the overall risk reduction for the BPCS protection layer(s) and SIS(s) exceeded 
10,000 (i.e., equivalent to 4 orders of magnitude in LOPA), the impact of systematic error could 
no longer be considered negligible in the evaluation of risk reduction achieved. ANSI/ISA 
84.00.01 addressed these issues for a single function in a clause on the requirements for a SIL 4 
SIF.   
 
However, even when the risk reduction allocation is spread over multiple protection layers with 
independent primary safety system devices (sensors, logic solvers, final elements), common 
personnel are often used to program, operate and maintain the instrumented safeguards. Likewise, 
internal process and external environmental impacts on the reliable operation of instrumentation 
can impact multiple instrumented functions. ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 included requirements to address 
common cause and dependent cause failure between all protection layers, as well as with the BPCS 
that could initiate a demand on those protections. Where multiple instrumented safeguards 
provided an overall risk reduction of 10,000, all the issues noted in the clause on SIL 4 SIFs would 
 
be applicable to the required common cause analysis.  Making it easier to recognize the technical 
interaction of the ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 clauses, the SIL-4 clause in ANSI/ISA 61511-1 explicitly 
addresses the case where the risk reduction of 10,000 is spread across multiple instrumented 
safeguards.  
 
2.3 SRS clarity and traceability 
Experienced users of ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 reflected that the safety requirements specification 
(SRS) and the instrument selection justification for SIS are sometimes written in highly technical 
language that may not be maintainable, verifiable, or even understandable by operations and 
maintenance, but which nevertheless were considered compliant with the standard.  For example, 
it could not always be determined that the information used in the instrument selection and system 
design was even relevant to the operating environment for that installation. As is the case with any 
other engineering document, clarity and applicability of this information is essential to achieving 
and maintaining the expected performance of the resulting system, including supporting nearly 
inevitable management of change. ANSI/ISA 61511-1 requires clarity and traceability of all the 
assumed parameters back to the SRS, H&RA, and operating environment, not just the application 
programming as was already required in ANSI/ISA 84.00.01. The requirement for clarity and 
traceability reflects the automation systems engineering reality described above and supports the 
OSHA PSM expectation that the compilation of  process safety information enables “the employer 
and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards”.  
 
3 Detailed Design and Engineering 
Most of the current SIS hardware requirements have origins in the original standard from over two 
decades ago. However, some of the design and engineering clauses in ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 were 
unnecessarily complex.  Design and engineering change themes implemented in ANSI/ISA 61511-
1 sought to relocate or reword these more complex provisions to make them easier to understand 
and simpler to incorporate into a design. Being a standard addressing instrumented safety systems, 
design and engineering provision changes also needed to be made to reflect the ongoing evolution 
in industrial automation and control system technology. 
 
3.1 Application programming provision relocation 
When they were added to IEC 61511-1:2003, the set of new provisions related to SIS application 
programming were gathered together in clause 12. For simplicity of adoption into ISA, this 
structure was unchanged in ANSI/ISA 84.00.01. With the rest of the document being structured in 
the order of the safety lifecycle, however, this separation let to confusion regarding when the 
application programming activities were to take place during the execution of a project.  In 
addition, some of these activities would typically impact both the hardware and application 
program design or implementation, requiring careful coordination. In ANSI/ISA 61511-1, a 
significant number of application programming provisions were relocated from clause 12 to 
provide clearer guidance on when the activity should be executed. For example, application 
program safety requirements have been incorporated into the main SRS requirements to emphasize 
 
the need for a close relationship between the SIS SRS and the application program safety 
requirement development. 
 
3.2 Hardware fault tolerance 
Prescriptive hardware fault tolerance (HFT) limits were added in the previous edition of the 
standard to mitigate some of the more common design and implementation systematic failures: 
 
a) Using overly optimistic reliability parameter assumptions 
b) Maintenance error such as leaving a root valve closed or a bypass jumper in place  
 
However, the complex rules, which had been derived from the original edition of IEC 61508-2 
[11], were themselves subject to systematic error and differences of interpretation. The basic HFT 
requirements in ANSI/ISA 61511-1 are simplified, adapting one of the second edition IEC 61508-
2 [12] approaches in a manner that better supports implementation using prior use justification of 
SIS field devices within the process sector.   
 
3.3 Fault detection, bypassing, and compensating measures 
One common underlying SIS design assumption is that a SIS device will be out of service due to 
bypass or detected failure for a limited time and that compensating measures will be used to 
manage any gap in risk reduction during that time. This expectation is closely aligned to the OSHA 
PSM requirement that the employer “correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable 
limits…before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure 
safe operation.”  ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 addressed this concept in a series of provisions that stated 
the requirement in a different way depending on the architecture of the subsystem that was 
degraded. User observations from a decade of application of this standard exposed a lack of clarity 
regarding the requirement of managing known periods of SIS unavailability or degraded 
performance while the equipment the SIS was designed to protect remained in operation. The two 
clauses in ANSI/ISA 61511-1 that require compensating measures to maintain safe operation when 
a dangerous fault in the SIS is detected or when the SIS is bypassed are stated in a simpler manner 
than in the prior edition.   
 
3.4 Cybersecurity for SIS 
With continued occurrences of successful cyber security attacks against industrial control systems 
and more frequent installations of SIS with digital communication to other devices, cybersecurity 
needed to be incorporated into the updated SIS standard. To avoid unnecessary overlap with the 
ANSI/ISA 62443 [13] series of standards on network and system security for industrial 
communication networks, ANSI/ISA 61511 contains only two new clauses on this topic. The first 
requires a security risk assessment to be performed that included the SIS. The second clause 
requires the SIS be designed to provide the necessary resilience against the identified security 
risks. Located in the risk analysis and detailed design sections of ANSI/ISA 61511-1, these two 
clauses are “anchors” that can help the user understand how the ANSI/ISA 62443 activities should 




4 Operations and Maintenance 
As noted above, a primary change theme behind the new content in ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 was the 
incorporation of functional safety management requirements. Most of these have very clear 
relationships to OSHA PSM requirements, with technical details added appropriate to the nature 
of instrumented safety systems.  However, over time it became evident that the topics of existing 
systems, change management, and periodic performance assessment were still systematically 
confusing to some users of the standard. 
 
4.1 Existing systems 
Addressing systems that predated the standard has been incorporated into all editions of the SIS 
standard. This concept is sometimes referred to as “grandfathering”. In ANSI/ISA 84.00.01, the 
provision on existing systems had been located in the scope section of the document.  This led to 
a misunderstanding that none of the functional safety management requirements would apply to 
such systems. Such a misunderstanding would have also been inconsistent with the expectations 
of OSHA PSM as well. In ANSI/ISA 61511-1, the clause on existing systems is relocated into 
clause 5, to clarify that the ongoing management of systems that predated the standard is part of 
functional safety management and that only the hardware and application programming (i.e., the 
SIS) were intended to be “grandfathered”.  
 
4.2 Change management 
As part of the process safety information defined in OSHA PSM, the SIS and other safeguard 
systems and all documentation related to it were already subject to change management in the U.S, 
inclusive of the H&RA itself.  Since existing SIS tend to be changed piece by piece, however, 
further clarity was needed in clauses 5 and 17 on how to handle such changes using the functional 
safety management activities, such as system verification and validation. This includes changes 
that affect the requirements on an existing SIS.  
  
4.3 Performance metrics and quality assurance 
A common concern in SIS design is the use of overly optimistic data or data that is not applicable 
to the operating environment the SIS will be used in.  However, even if data and assumptions 
appropriate to a given operating environment are used in the initial SIS design, variations in the 
performance of the process, operations, maintenance, and automation management systems over 
time can result in poor system performance and inadequate risk reduction.  The only way to correct 
for these systematic errors and restore the necessary performance is to collect performance data on 
an ongoing basis, periodically assess for conformance to the H&RA and SRS requirements, and 
correct deviations as needed.  The expectations of performance monitoring and quality assurance 






The SIS standard began alongside the origination of process safety management regulation. ISA 
S84.01 evolved from a document focused primarily on hardware management to the well-rounded 
ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 standard addressing both the hardware and human side of functional safety 
management. ANSI/ISA 61511-1, the third stage of  evolution of the SIS standard, strives for 
continuous improvement in the global use of its long-established requirements. The changes 
between ANSI/ISA 61511-1 and the previous edition contains updates primarily intended to create 
more consistent understanding and application of previously existing provisions. The major 
themes of change address topics such as risk reduction allocation between instrumented 
safeguards, prescriptive design requirements for HFT, managing risk during bypass or failure of 
safety system devices, and the need to “close the loop” on functional safety performance to ensure 
the overall control and safety systems are delivering the performance assumed in the H&RA and 
SIS design. Finally, in keeping with the technological advances in automation systems, ANSI/ISA 
61511-1 includes crucial cross-ties to cybersecurity requirements that make the SIS more resilient 
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